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ASEAN had created the ASEAN Regional Guidelines 
on Competition Policy and Handbook on 
Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN for Business 
as guides for assessment of the behaviour of business 
people in the industry and market. The Regional 
Guidelines “only” help member countries in 
increasing awareness of the importance of business 
competition policies. The execution of business 
competition is then left to the ASEAN member 
country, to be in accordance with national business 
competition policies. Meanwhile, the ASEAN 
Economic Community will allow business people in 
ASEAN countries to conduct business transactions 
in whichever country they prefer. Without clear 
regulations, businesspeople can freely carry out 
cross-border transactions that can disrupt the 
domestic market of each ASEAN member country. 
Differences in regulatory substances and the 
absence of competition law regulations in several 
ASEAN member countries will undoubtedly become 
a challenge for the application of competition laws 
by businesspeople in the ASEAN regional market. 
However, in relation to AFTA, the primary urgency 
is instead the realization of imposing tariffs of 0-5% 
by performing the harmonization of regulations in 
the field of Customs and the removal of other forms 
of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). The removal of trade 
barriers is one of the things that are also regulated 
in competition law. This article is the result of 
normative juridical research that analyzes the 
differences in the substance of competition law in 
several ASEAN countries along with their juridical 
implications, to be able to evaluate the urgency of 
harmonizing legal regulations on business 
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ASEAN has issued the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition 
Policy as a guide to the regulations for general competition law for its member 
countries in the effort to form the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). 
However, even now, ASEAN still has not possessed specific policies and 
institutions in the regulation and supervision of business activities that are 
carried out among its member countries. There also has not yet been any 
agreement in the policies of ASEAN regional business competition, which 
would become guidelines for policy application. The execution of business 
competition supervision is left to the member states, to be carried out 
according to national policies on business competition. 
AEC is a single market for the Southeast Asia region, which has the aim 
to increase foreign investment in the region. For AEC to become a competitive 
region with a market that functions optimally, the regulations on competition 
need to be operational and effective. The fundamental aim of policies and laws 
on business competition is to create equality or equalisation of opportunities 
for all parties, though of different ownership. The application of competition 
regulations that forbid anti-competitive activities is an important way to 
facilitate liberalization as well as integrated markets and bases of production 
and to support the formation of a more competitive and innovative region.1 
For the formation of a single market, the equalizing of legal principles 
becomes very important, and the same is true for business competition law. 
AEC will allow business people in ASEAN countries to be able to conduct 
business transactions in whichever country they prefer. The aim of AEC is 
indeed quite noble, which is to make it easier for business people to keep their 
enterprises running. However, this aim will become a detriment if not 
supported by laws regarding the competition that can outline clear regulations 
that apply globally to all businesspeople. According to Nawir Messi, without 
clear regulations, businesspeople may freely conduct cross-border 
transactions that may disrupt domestic markets, including in Indonesia.  
Regarding this matter, for example, in Indonesia, collusive tendering is 
regulated by the rule of reason, while in Malaysia and Singapore, it is 
regulated as per se illegal. In Indonesia, tying agreements are considered as 
exclusive dealing and is regulated as per se illegal, while in Malaysia and 
Singapore, it is regulated under the stipulations of misuse of the dominant 
position and as such is regulated as rule of reason. Another example regards 
the merger control system, which in Indonesia is based on assets or turnover, 
while in Singapore and Vietnam is based on the level of market share. 
Regarding the timing of the notification, Indonesia adopts a post-notification 
system, while Singapore follows the system of the United Kingdom, in which 
the time that the notification is performed is entirely left to the parties of the 
merger. Only Indonesia penalizes parties in an alliance if they do not report 
                                                             
1 ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blue Print (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2015), 75. 
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the merger activity, while four other member nations with merger control can 
impose penalties if the merger that is performed results in anti-competitive 
behaviour in the market. 
Other differences concern, for example, determining the scope of 
institutions that have authority in business competition, in particular in 
distributing functions and authority between the competent institution and the 
courts; some countries institute dual functions as investigator and adjudicator, 
and others divide responsibilities between authority (investigation) and the 
courts (for making verdicts).  
When compared with business competition law in the European Union, 
there is a very fundamental difference, because, for all member countries of 
the European Union, business competition is regulated generally in Article 
101 and Article 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Thus, the two articles apply for all member countries of the European 
Union. In the enforcement process for both articles, the European Union also 
has a special commission for a business competition that possesses legal 
authority for handling all cases of suspected anti-competition in all member 
countries of the European Union. Meanwhile, in ASEAN, each member 
country regulates its law on the competition by itself. The absence of general 
provisions has made the primary substance of competition laws among 
ASEAN countries “disharmonious”, which indeed implements an ASEAN 
single market with a healthy climate of business competition even more 
difficult to be implemented. Based on the chronology detailed in the 
background, this is the problem raised in this research: what is the urgency of 
harmonizing legal regulations on competition law among countries in the 




1. The Challenge of Differences in Legal Substance Regulation 
The significant differences in legal substance among the member 
countries of ASEAN are determined by a number of factors that affected the 
formation of laws on the business competition during their composition, 
including its history. Several countries adopted the law and policy voluntarily, 
and others adopted because of certain goals such as legal reforms, ending an 
economic crisis, and the commitment to the consensus on free trade. 
Multifunctional authority to investigate as well as to deliver verdicts on 
competition law violations becomes a major challenge for competition 
agencies, particularly if their competence is doubted.  
The above issues have certainly led to differences in the concepts of 
business competition laws. Some of the differing legal substance among 
others include, for example, regulation on the substance of anti-competitive 
actions, the nature of prohibitions on anti-competitive actions, the dominant 




position and the misuse of that dominant position, and regulation on mergers 
and acquisitions, as explained below: 
 
a. Scope of Businesspeople, Extraterritorial Doctrine, and Single Entity 
Doctrine 
In relation to the definition of “business people”, the stipulations of 
Article 1 Number (5) of Indonesia follow the Exterritorial Doctrine, and 
implicitly and based on several decisions, the Business Competition 
Supervisory Commission (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, KPPU) 
follows the concept of Single Economic Entity Doctrine, while Singapore and 
Malaysia follow the concept of effect doctrine.2 “Businesspeople” is a vital 
element to determine whether a person/enterprise may be considered to have 
violated Law No. 5 of the Year 1999. In-Law No. 5 of the Year 1999, it is 
mentioned that business people may consist of individual people or enterprise. 
This is as stated in Article 1 Number (5) of Law No. 5 of the Year 1999:  
All individual persons or enterprise, whether in the form of a legal entity 
or not a legal entity that is established and residing or conducting activities in 
the legal territory of the Republic of Indonesia, whether on their own or 
together through an agreement, organizing various businesses in the field of 
economy.(Depan & Sehat, n.d.) 
The grouping of businesspeople in business competition law is very 
important in determining businesspeople for which the Business Competition 
Law of Indonesia may be applied. From the formulation of Article 1 Number 
(5), it is clear that Indonesia adopts the territorial principle for its business 
competition law. It means that for business people who establish or run 
businesses in Indonesia, Law No. 5 of the Year 1999 may be applied.3 
In 2004, through Verdict Number 07/KPPU-L/2000, the KPPU for the 
first time indicted foreign businesses that were not established in Indonesia 
but conducted business activities in Indonesia, which are Goldman Sachs 
(Singapore) and Frontlite, Ltd. (Bermuda). Goldman Sachs was established 
based on the legal regulations of the Republic of Singapore and Frontlite, Ltd. 
of Bermuda, formerly named Frontlite AB, was established in 1985 and listed 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange from 1989 to 1997.4 
In its verdict, the KPPU implicitly utilised the principle of Single 
Economic Entity Doctrine, which is a principle with the view that there is a 
relationship between parent companies and subsidiaries, where subsidiaries 
do not possess the independence to determine the policy direction of a 
                                                             
2 Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha, Kompetisi Menuju Pasar Bebas ASEAN, 42nd Edition 
(Jakarta: KPPU, 2013), 21. 
3 Andy Tanaka, “Reformulation of Usage of Single Economic Entity Doctrine in Business 
Competition Law in Indonesia,” Unpublished Thesis, Faculty of Law of the University of 
Brawijaya, (2016): 8. 
4 Verdict Number 07/KPPU-L/2000, p. 54. 
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company as a single united economic entity.5 The consequence of the 
application of the Single Economic Entity Doctrine is that businesspeople may 
be held responsible for actions that may be conducted by other business people 
in an economic unit, even though the former operates outside the legal 
jurisdiction of business competition laws of a country, and thus business 
competition law can be considered extraterritorial.6 
In the Temasek case in 2007, the KPPU explicitly applied the Single 
Economic Entity Doctrine. The case involved nine business people who were 
reported to have conducted violations of Law No. 5 of the Year 1999. In the 
case, Temasek Holdings as the parent company possessed the majority of 
shares in two companies who do business activities in the same field in the 
same related market, thus violating Article 27 Letter an of Law No. 5 of the 
Year 1999. Temasek Holdings possessed cross-ownership of shares in PT. 
Indosat Tbk. And PT. Telkomsel. Through Verdict Number 07/KPPU-
L/2007, KPPU applies the Single Economic Entity Doctrine again and 
explicitly mentions as such, to indict foreign businesspeople present outside 
the jurisdiction of Indonesia.  
With the application of the Single Economic Entity Doctrine, there is 
an expansion of subjects of business competition law. The presence of 
enterprises and businesspeople does not have to be factually established and 
residing in Indonesia, but for business people who indirectly conduct business 
activities in Indonesia, as long as the businesspeople have relationships with 
companies who run business activities in Indonesia, they may be categorized 
as a subject of business competition law in Indonesia.  
Next, in 2008, the KPPU also applied the Single Economic Entity 
Doctrine for the case of the Premier League broadcasting monopoly by Astro 
Group. In the case, three foreign businesspeople were indicted in violation of 
Law No. 5 of the Year 1999: Astro All Asia Networks, Plc (Malaysia); ESPN 
STAR Sports (Singapore); and All Asia Multimedia Network, FZ-LLC 
(United Arab Emirates).7 In 2010, in the case of the cartel by the 
pharmaceutical industry Amlodipine-class drug therapy, the KPPU also used 
the Single Economic Entity Doctrine to indict foreign parties that were 
involved. Four foreign parties were indicted in violation of Law No. 5 of the 
Year 1999, which were Pfizer Inc. (USA); Pfizer Overseas LLC (USA); Pfizer 
Global Trading (Ireland); and Pfizer Corporation Panama (Panama).8 
Over its course, the use of the Single Economic Entity Doctrine, aside 
from generating many debates along with many experts, also regarding the 
differences of concept and scope about who might be called businesspeople 
in several countries, has caused many problems. As an example, in the 
                                                             
5 Verdict Number 07/KPPU-L/2000, p. 36. 
6 Verdict Number 07/KPPU-L/2000, p. 37. 
7 Refer to KPPU Verdict Number 03/KPPU-L/2008, p. 1. 
8 Refer to KPPU Verdict Number: 17/KPPU-I/2010, p. 1. 




Temasek case, the Defendant in the case raised the issue regarding the 
jurisdiction of the KPPU in indicting using Law No. 5 of the Year 1999. The 
Defendant stated that “Temasek Group” does not have control over Co-
Defendant IX or even Indosat, and as such does not conduct business activities 
in Indonesia through the two companies. Co-Defendants V and VI mutually 
do not possess more than 41.94% of the shares of Indosat without special 
voting rights, including veto rights. Co-DefendantVIII only owns 35% of the 
shares of Co-Defendant IX, without voting rights or veto rights.9 
Thus, regarding the stockholder who controls Indosat or Co-Defendant 
IX, it is the Government of Indonesia that possesses SeriesAshares with veto 
rights in Indosat and (through Telkom) possesses 65% of the shares of Co-
DefendantIX. The Government of Indonesia also appoints the majority of 
Directors of Indosat (including the Chief Director) and selects the majority of 
Directors and Commissioners of Co-Defendant IX. The evidence put forward 
by the Plaintiff, Co-Defendants I to IX, and Indosat proved that the Plaintiff 
and/or “Temasek Group” does not have control of Co-Defendant IX or even 
Indosat. The consideration of the Defendants that the Plaintiff and/or 
“Temasek Group” has de facto controlled policies from Co-Defendant IX and 
Indosat is based on criteria that are faulty and ignores the existing evidence.  
In addition, in the case of the Premier League broadcasting monopoly 
by Astro Group, All Asia Multimedia Networks, FZ-LLC (AAMN) put 
forward an objection on KPPU Verdict Number 03/KPPU-L/2008 to the State 
Court of Central Jakarta. Part of the objection is that AAMN is an outside 
party that resides and conducts business activities overseas. Thus, the single 
economic entity doctrine cannot be applied in this case.  
As well, AAMN is not a stockholder of PT Direct Vision (PT DV)10 
whether directly or indirectly. AAMN is merely a supplier for PT DV and 
does not have control over PT DV.11All Asia Multimedia Networks, FZ-LLC 
(AAMN), which in the case of the Premier League broadcasting monopoly by 
                                                             
9 Supreme Court Verdict Number 496/K/Pdt.Sus/2008, pp. 11-12. 
10 PT Direct Vision (PT DV), in the case of the Premier League broadcasting monopoly by 
Astro Group having the status of Co-Defendant I, is an enterprise in the legal entity form of a 
corporation (Perseroan Terbatas) established based on the legal regulations of the Republic of 
Indonesia, with statutes that were last changed based on Act Number 119 by Sutjipto, S.H. as 
the notary. Its shares are possessed by PT Ayunda Prima Mitra (49%) and Silver Concord 
Holdings Limited (51%), wherein PT Ayunda Prima Mitra is owned by PT Broadband 
Multimedia, Tbk (now PT First Media, Tbk), which is one of the subsidiaries of Lippo Group, 
currently residing at Citra Graha Building Floor 9, Jalan Jenderal Gatot Subroto Kavling 35-36 
Jakarta 12950, Indonesia. Its business activity is the provision of paid television based on the 
Directorate General of Post and Telecommunications Notice Number 14 February 2005 
regarding the permits of providing multimedia telecommunication services as paid television, 
and conducts business activities from February 28, 2006 in the region of Indonesia using the 
trademark “ASTRO”. 
11 Anonymous, AAMN Objects to the KPPU Verdict: AAMN Considers KPPU to Have 
Misapplied the Law in the Premier League Broadcasting Rights Case, March 29, 2016, 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol20246/aamn-ajukan-keberatan-putusan-kppu. 
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Astro Group has the status of Co-DefendantIV, is an enterprise in the legal 
entity form of a company established in April 2006 in Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. Its shares are 100% fully owned by Astro All Asia Networks, Plc 
(AAAN), which currently resides at Dubai World Center Floor 6, Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates, with a branch office in All Asia Broadcast Centre, 
Technology Park Malaysia, Lebuhraya Puchong Sungai Besi, 57000 Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. Its primary business activities are to obtain content and 
create television channels in Indonesian and Malaysian languages to be 
supplied to paid television operators operated by Astro, as PT Direct Vision 
(PT DV) in Indonesia, Measat Broadcast Network Systems Sdn. Bhd (MBNS) 
in Malaysia, and “Kristal Astro” di Brunei Darussalam. Its secondary activity 
is the procurement of decoders to be supplied to PTDV in Indonesia.  
In the case of the amlodipine pharmacy industry cartel, Pfizer 
Indonesia, which did not participate in the Supply Agreement created by 
Pfizer Overseas LLC with PT Dexa Medica, also questioned the use as well 
as the principle of Single Economic Entity Doctrine. Pfizer Indonesia rejected 
the theory posed by the KPPU regarding Pfizer Group in relating the 
agreement with Pfizer Indonesia. Pfizer Indonesia had the opinion that there 
was no legal basis for the KPPU to pose the theory of the Pfizer Group.12 In 
addition, Pfizer Indonesia stated that there was no legal basis for Single 
Economic Entity in the legal stipulations that apply in Indonesia.13 
From the above explanation, inconsistencies regarding the concept and 
the scope of businesspeople in several countries including ASEAN member 
countries have created many problems and resulted in juridical implications 
in the effort of business competition law enforcement; as such, it becomes 
urgent to find solutions immediately. 
 
b. Regarding Regulation of Legal Substance of Anti-Competitive 
Actions, Prohibition of Anti-Competitive Actions, and Related 
Evidence 
 
1) Cartel as an anti-competitive act 
All countries that regulate competitive law will always regulate cartels. A 
cartel is a form of an agreement by a number of free companies. The aim is 
clearly to affect products and the marketing of a commodity to obtain a 
monopolistic advantage. According to the Black Law Dictionary, “Cartel is a 
combination of procedures or sellers that join together to control products, 
production, or price. Cartel is also an association of firms with a common 
interest. It seeks to prevent extreme or unfair competition, allocates markets, 
or share knowledge.”14 
                                                             
12 KPPU Verdict Number 17/KPPU-I/2010, p. 97. 
13 Ibid., p. 132. 
14 KPPU Verdict Number 17/KPPU-I/2010, pp. 9&206. 




Cartel may be categorized in a narrow and broad scope. Narrowly, the 
cartel is a group of businesspeople who compete with one another, but they 
only agree to cooperate to establish prices, enabling them to obtain profits 
above a suitable level. 
Meanwhile, cartel broadly is an agreement between two or more business 
people who conduct harmonization of behaviours or actions to cover up 
competition among them in the market by dividing marketing territory, 
distributing consumers, and fixing prices. As such, the most commonly 
occurring kind of cartel among businesspeople are price-fixing agreements, 
collusive tendering, agreements of market area division or consumer 
distribution, and agreements to limit production quota.15 Next, according to 
the OECD, the cartel is a formal agreement among companies in an 
oligopolistic industry. Members of a cartel can make agreements, for example, 
on price, output, limited marketing area, consumer distribution, profit sharing, 
or any combination of these.16 
Through cartels, producers can establish higher prices and obtain 
incredible profits. The Government of Australia has even classified cartel, 
which includes price-fixing, as a “white-collar crime”, as a criminal act that is 
often characterized as having no victim like crimes in general, instead of 
bringing about hefty fees on market participants, as stated by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Thus, one kind of legal 
regulation is to ensure the organization of a free and fair market, which 
includes the prevention of price-fixing by businesspeople. 
Competition regulations in Malaysia and Singapore no longer use the 
terminology of “cartel”; they instead detail the several ways in which cartels 
may be realized: 
a) Singapore, Competition Act of 2004, Section2:  
Agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices which have as their object or effect 
the appreciable prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
Singapore will fall within the scope of the Section 34 Prohibition unless 
they are excluded under the Third Schedule or fall within a category 
specified in a block exemption order. Any provision in the Act expressed 
to apply in relation to an 'agreement' is taken as applying equally, with 
                                                             
15 R. Shyam Khemani, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law 
and Policy (Paris: The World Bank-OECD, 1999), 21. 
16 “A cartel is a formal agreement among firms in an oligopolistic industry. Cartel members 
may agree on such matters as prices, total industry output, market shares, allocation of 
customers, allocation of territories, bid-rigging, establishment of common sales agencies, and 
the division of profits or combination of these”, Glossary of Statistical Terms, 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3159, accessed August 1, 2010. Also refer to the 
OECDRecommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core 
Cartels, adopted by the council in meeting session 921 on March 25, 1998 [C/M (98) 7/PROV]; 
see also R. Shyam Khemani, Op.Cit., 21. 
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the necessary modifications, in relation to a decision by an association of 
undertakings or a concerted practice. 
b) Malaysia, Competition Act of 2010, Section 4: 
(1) A horizontal or vertical agreement between enterprises is prohibited 
insofar as the agreement has the object or effect of significantly 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition in any market for 
goods or services. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a horizontal 
agreement between enterprises which has the object to: 
a. fix, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other 
trading conditions;  
b. share market or sources of supply;  
c. limit or control— (i) production; (ii) market outlets or market 
access; (iii) technical or technological development; or (iv) 
investment; or  
d. perform an act of bid rigging, 
is deemed to have the object of significantly preventing, 
restricting, or distorting competition in any market for goods or 
services.  
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, cartels are regulated in stipulations of Article 
11 of Law No. 5 of the Year 1999: “Businesspeople are forbidden to create 
agreements with competing for business people that are intended to affect 
prices by regulating expenses and/or marketing”. Article 11 is only limited to 
agreements that establish the sale of certain goods with the intent of achieving 
certain desired prices. The use of the “cartel” term in Article 11 seemingly 
indicates that cartels are narrowly interpreted, although in reality the 
indications of cartels are regulated in several other stipulations, among them 
Article 5, Article 9, and Article 22 of Law No. 5 of the Year 1999, as indicated 
by the following table: 
Table 1: Indications of the cartel in several regulatory in Law Number 
5 of Year 1999 
 
No. Article Substance Category 
1 5: Price 
Fixing 
a. Businesspeople are forbidden 
to create agreements with 
competing business people to 
establish prices on certain 
goods and/or services that must 
be paid by consumers or 
subscribers in the same related 
market.  
b. The stipulations, as expressed 
in paragraph (1) do not apply 
to:  
Price cartel 




a. agreements created in a joint 
venture; or 
b. agreements created based on 
applicable legal regulations. 
2. 9: Area 
Distribution 
Businesspeople are forbidden to 
create agreements with competing 
businesspeople with the intent to 
divide the marketing area or market 
allocation of goods and/or services, 
thus possibly resulting in 
monopolistic and/or unhealthy 





Businesspeople are forbidden to 
ally with other parties to regulate 
and/or determine the winner of a 
tender, thus possibly resulting in 
unhealthy business competition. 
Collusive 
tendering 
Source: Primary Legal Materials, processed 
 
2) The Nature of Cartel Prohibitions 
The nature of prohibiting anti-competitive acts may be classified as per se 
illegal or rule of reason. The concept of per se illegal is the statement that 
certain agreements or business activities violate the law, without further proof 
of the effects of those agreements or business activities. Events that are 
considered per se illegal usually cover collusive price-fixing on certain 
products, as well as the regulation of resale value.17In other words, the focus 
of competition law paradigm is that if the prohibition is absolute, then the 
concept is per se illegal, but if it is supplementary, then it will be decided 
based on the consideration of reasonableness18 from the reasons. 
                                                             
17 R. Sheyam Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and 
Competition Law, (Paris: OECD, 1996), 51, in Lubis, Andi Fahmy. Anggraini, A.M. Toha, Tri 
Kurnia. Kagramanto, L. Budi. Hawin, M. Sirait, Ningrum Natasya.  Sukarmi.  Maarif, Silalahi, 
Syamsul Udin, Persaingan Usaha antara Teks dan Konteks, (Indonesia: Published and Printed 
with Support of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, 2009), 
55. 
18 The term “reasonableness” was first used in the case of Mitchel vs. Reynolds in 1711 by Lord 
Macclesfield, whose legal opinion actually refers to the verdict of Dyer’s case. The case of 
Mitchel vs. Reynolds concerns a baker in doing his business and an established agreement that 
forbids the baker to conduct his business for a certain time and in a certain area (within a period 
of five years). An agreement such as this is considered to violate competition, divide regions, 
and limit the entry into a market. Dyer’s case concerns when Dyer was forbidden to conduct 
business related to his expertise for six months as an effort to pay debts. Efforts such as these 
that are written in agreements, in connection to competition, is considered as an effort to impede 
competition. Ningrum Natasya Sirait, Hukum Persaingan di Indonesia (Medan: Pustaka 
Bangsa Press, 2004), p. 75. 
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Meanwhile, the concept of the rule of reason is an approach used by a 
business competition supervisory authority to conduct evaluations regarding 
the effects of certain agreements or business activities, in order to determine 
whether the agreements or activities impede or support competition.19 Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines a rule of reason as the following:20 
“Under ‘rule of reason’ test for determining whether alleged acts violated 
§1 the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 U.S.C.A. §1), which declares conspiracies 
in restraint of trade to be illegal, fact-finder must weigh all circumstances of 
the case to decide whether practice unreasonably restrains competition and 
the test requires that plaintiff show anticompetitive effects, or actual harm to 
competition, and not whether the practices were unfair or tortious” 
Regarding the nature of prohibitions, hardcore cartels, in general, are 
established to be prohibited per se illegal, such as in the regulations 
implemented in Singapore21 and Malaysia,22 but this is not the case with Law 
Number 5 of the Year 1999. Differences in cartel regulations, including the 
nature of the prohibition, makes out Indonesia to be a “potential market” in a 
                                                             
19 “The rule of reason is a legal approach by competition authorities or the courts where an 
attempt is made to evaluate the pro-competitive features of a restrictive business practice 
against its anticompetitive effects in order to decide whether or not the practice should be 
prohibited. Some market restrictions which prima facie give rise to competition issues may on 
further examination be found to have valid efficiency-enhancing benefits. For example, a 
manufacturer may restrict supply of a product in different geographic markets only to existing 
retailers so that they earn higher profits and have an incentive to advertise the product and 
provide better service to customers. This may have the effect of expanding the demand for the 
manufacturer's product more than the increase in quantity demanded at a lower price. The 
opposite of the rule of reason approach is to declare certain business practices per se illegal, 
that is, always illegal are per se illegal.”, in the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics 
and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, Commissioned by the 
Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, (1993), August 1, 2011. 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3305. 
20 Bryan A. Graner, (2004), Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1332. 
21 Section 34(2) of the Act provides an illustrative but not exhaustive list of agreements which 
may be prohibited. These include agreements which (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or 
selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, 
technical development or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply 
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; or (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
22 Section 4 (2) : 
Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a horizontal agreement between 
enterprises which has the object to : 
a. fix, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions;  
b. share market or sources of supply;  
c. limit or control— (i) production; (ii) market outlets or market access; (iii) technical or 
technological development; or (iv) investment; or  
d. perform an act of bid rigging, 
is deemed to have the object of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting competition 
in any market for goods or services 




negative connotation, particularly for actors of regional cartel sand collusive 
tendering. 
 
3) The Proving of Cartels 
As has been previously explained, in the execution, cartel actors often do 
away with all forms of direct agreements and communication, and instead, 
conduct meetings in secret.23 The core point of a cartel is that there is a 
commitment from the members of a cartel to follow the agreements that they 
have made.  
As such, in their developments, cartels are often conducted in secret and 
are thus very hard to be detected by law enforcers. Meanwhile, although the 
amount of loss by consumers due to the presence of cartels is not known, the 
occurring tendency shows that excesses of prices due to cartels is quite large. 
It is because the prices from the cartel agreement are prices that are higher 
than prices that would be created due to competition. The experience of 
various countries shows that cartel prices can reach 400% above the market 
price. Therefore, it is no wonder that loss due to cartels can reach billions or 
even trillions of rupiahs.24 
The fact that cartels are hard to detect and the consequences of cartels that 
very much cause loss make the law enforcement process on cartel practices 
urgent to be performed. The availability of evidence mainly causes difficulties 
in the enforcement process. It is because business people engaged in cartels 
no longer live in ancient times where every agreement must be verbally 
written on paper, stamped, and signed.  
In the effort indict cartels amidst the impossibility of finding hardcore 
evidence, an evolution in evidence came about, called “indirect evidence”. 
The network of competition supervisory institutions around the world created 
a new method to uncover violations of prohibitions by cartels, by using 
indirect evidence as an alternative to conventional direct evidence. Indirect 
evidence includes communicative evidence and economic evidence. In 
addition, there needs to be a “plus” factor in strengthening indirect evidence. 
Several ASEAN countries do not have problems with any evidence, 
whether direct evidence or indirect evidence, but not Indonesia. From 2010 to 
2015 alone, there were several KPPU verdicts related to cartels that were 
annulled by state courts, with the uniform reason that the evidence presented 
by the KPPU was considered not strong enough because no direct evidence 
was used and only indirect evidence was involved. 
Several KPPU verdicts regarding suspected cartels were annulled by the 
State Courts and/or the Supreme Courts with the reason that the State Courts 
and Supreme Court do not recognize the use of indirect evidence as 
                                                             
23 Jhonny Ibrahim, (2007), Business Competition Law: Philosophy, Theory, and Implications 
of Implementation in Indonesia, Malang: Bayu Media, pp. 230-231. 
24 Guide on Article 5 on Price Agreements 
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evidence.25 KPPU Chief Syarkawi Rauf admits that indirect evidence is often 
cast aside by courts “because many judges do not understand clearly about 
circumstantial evidence.” 26 In addition, while judges confirm that the prices 
present in the market is a fact, yet so do they with meeting minutes found by 
investigators; both are facts. However, the problem becomes how to relate 
those minutes with the prices present in the market, without going through 
analysis by economic experts. It is a matter that Indonesian courts cannot yet 
accept.27 
The following is a list of KPPU verdicts on suspected cartels that were 
annulled by State Courts and/or the Supreme Court: 
 
Table2: KPPU verdicts on suspected cartels that were annulled by State 
Courts and/or the Supreme Court: 
No. Verdict Notes 
1. KPPU Verdict Number 
25/KPPU-I/2009 on the 
Application of Fuel Surcharge 
in the Domestic Airplane 
Services Industry 
 
The Defendants – PT Garuda 
Indonesia, PT Sriwijaya Air, PT 
Merpati Nusantara Airlines, PT 
Mandala Airlines, PT Travel 
Express Aviation Service, PT Lion 
Mentari Airlines, PT Wings Abadi 
Airlines, PT Metro Batavia, and PT 
Kartika Airlines – filed an appeal to 
State Court, which then annulled the 
KPPU verdict with the reason that 
the proving of cartel was conducted 
merely with indirect evidence and 
not using direct evidence. 
2.  Case Number 17/KPPU-I/2010 
on Suspected Violations of 
Article 5, Article 11, Article 16, 
Article 25 Paragraph (1) Letter 
a of Law Number 5 of the Year 
1999 in the Amlodipine-Class 
Therapy Pharmacy Industry 
a. The council of judges affirm 
that they agree with the UI 
statistical economics expert 
Anton Hendranata, who stated 
that there was no same trend of 
rising prices of the two 
hypertension medications by PT 
Pfizer Indonesia and PT Dexa 
Medica. “There was no same 
trend of rising prices. The 
Plaintiff (KPPU) also did not 
                                                             
25 Happy Rayna Stephany, Courts Are Still “Allergic” to Indirect Evidence, November 21, 
2019. http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt5398841721bba/pengadilan-masih-alergi-
dengan-iindirect-evidence-i. 
26 November 21, 2019. https://babe.news/id-id/read/9342514/bukti-tidak-langsung-yang-bikin-
kppu-tidak-bertaji. 
27 Ibid. 




consider other similar 
businesses regarding 
hypertension medications.”28 
b. In addition, the council of 
judges of the same State Court 
also agreed with the opinion of 
economics expert Ine Ruki, who 
judged that KPPU was mistaken 
in determining the market. Even 
the evidence used to prove the 
existence of a cartel was 
considered infeasible since 
KPPU had utilized indirect 
evidence.  
c. Based on the expert opinion of 
Prof. Erman Rajagukguk, the 
use of indirect evidence is not 
acknowledged.29 
 Regarding the verdict of State 
Court, the KPPU filed an appeal 
to the Supreme Court. In its 
verdict, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the verdict of the 
State Court and rejected the 
appeal filed by the KPPU in the 
case of the pharmaceutical 
cartel against PT Pfizer 
Indonesia et,al. 
3. KPPU Verdict Number 
24/KPPU-I/2009 on the 
Cooking Oil Cartel 
a. The State Court of Central 
Jakarta stated that the evidence 
provided by the KPPU was 
considered not strong enough 
since there was no direct 
evidence to incriminate the 
cartel actors;  in its verdict, the 
State Court annulled the KPPU 
verdict.30 
b. KPPU then filed an appeal on 
the court verdict that refuted the 
                                                             
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 November 21, 2019. http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/ma-tolak-putusan-kppu-atas-kartel-
minyak-goreng. 
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verdict of the cartel. 
Unfortunately, the State Court 
also rejected the appeal by 
KPPU with the same reason as 
the State Court. 
Source: Primary Legal Materials, processed 
 
The above condition is worsened wherein with Law Number 5 of the 
Year 1999, the KPPU does not possess the authority to confiscate documents 
or to search for them; as well, the formality of usage of evidence tends to be 
conventional, covering witness statements, expert statements, documents or 
letters, instructions, and statements of business people. Here lies a very great 
challenge for KPPU in proving violations by cartels, whether in the form of 
agreements of price-fixing cartels, production quota cartels, and regional 
cartels, since generally in the process of proving, the KPPU does not find 
written agreements as the starting point of the intent of parties in creating a 
cartel. In its application, the proving of an unwritten deal can be done through 
evidence of agreement as found in meeting agendas in the form of minutes or 
notes. In this case, even if there were written agreements, the KPPU often has 
trouble in obtaining the data. The difficulty in obtaining evidence of 
agreements is caused by several issues, including uncooperative business 
people who refuse to provide data; on the other hand, there is an absence of 
KPPU authority to search and confiscate the required documents as 
evidence.31 
The KPPU has done in using indirect evidence or circumstantial 
evidence to prove cartels can be argued. In addition to the reason that the 
characteristics of cartels are difficult to prove formally, indirect evidence or 
circumstantial evidence has been regulated in the Guide to Article 5 of Law 
Number 5 of the Year 1999 as a form of evidence that indirectly states that 
there is agreement on price, supply, or regional division. Whatever the case, 
it seems that the State Courts still firmly hold the stipulations of Article 8 of 
Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia Regulation Number 03 of the 
Year 2005.32 The choice becomes difficult. If the regulations in Article 8 
above were rigidly applied, then there would be many cases of cartels that 
cannot be proven by the KPPU if direct evidence is not available, and the case 
is only based on indirect evidence in the form of communicative evidence and 
economic evidence categorized as initial evidence. 
                                                             
31 A. M. Tri Anggraini, “The Mechanisms of Detecting and Uncovering Cartels in Competition 
Law,” Faculty of Law Paper, University of Indonesia, (2011): 21. 
32 Hanif Nur Widhiyanti, “The Use of Indirect Evidence in Proving Suspected Violations of 
Law Number 5 of Year 1999 in the Perspective of Supreme Court Regulations, Number 3 of 
Year 2005,” DPP/SPP Research, Faculty of Law, University of Brawijaya, (2017): 31. 




Regarding this initial evidence, both Law Number 5 of the Year 1999 
and Commission Regulation Number 1 of the Year 2010 neither regulates nor 
explains about initial evidence as well as how this evidence is used in proving 
by the KPPU. 
Meanwhile, in the development of case handling, specifically cases of 
cartels in different parts of the world, efforts to prove the presence of cartels 
are not only done through direct or hard evidence, but also through other 
methods of determining through indirect or circumstantial evidence. It is 
occurring because direct evidence is becoming harder to find, as the presence 
of competition supervision institutions has become a considered factor; thus, 
matters related to direct evidence has been avoided by businesspeople. The 
development of handling cases of price-fixing in various parts of the world is 
also attempted not only through direct or hard evidence, but also through other 
methods of proving through indirect or circumstantial evidence. In the same 
way, direct evidence has become harder to find as the presence of competition 
supervision institutions has become a considered factor.33As such, Indonesia 
again will become a “potential market” in a negative sense regarding cartels, 
because so long as the effects of the two cartels cannot be proven, then a 
businessperson or a group of them cannot be punished by Law Number 5 of 
the Year 1999. 
 
4) Regarding Notifications of Acquisitions and Mergers 
It is undeniable that the merging of businesses and acquisition of shares is 
one of the strategies to increase company efficiency in conducting expansion 
to face the challenge of globalisation, which has been massively progressing 
in the past several years.34 For consumers, the merging of businesses and the 
acquisition of shares, on the one hand, may provide benefits if the gained 
efficiency translates to price reductions and increased quality of goods and/or 
services. Yet on the other hand, this strategy may also increase market 
concentration, which if not handled well may put consumers at a disadvantage 
later on.35 
Countries in Southeast Asia have decided to form an integrated economy 
in 2015, among others through investment, goods, services, free market for 
labour, the formation of a competitive area, and so on. To face this challenge, 
countries that are a part of ASEAN decided to introduce business competition 
policies to overcome the potential of market concentration and unhealthy 
competitive behaviours in the nation, which is expected to be able to prepare 
them to face the economic integration.36 For that, regulations regarding the 
merging of businesses and acquisition of shares become essential in the 
                                                             
33 Ibid., 32. 
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prevention of the market concentration potential that may impede the 
execution of this integration. The flow of investment among fellow ASEAN 
countries have reached 4.4 billion USD at the end of 2009, most of which 
belong to Singapore (46%), Indonesia (31%), and Thailand (13%).37 This 
indicates that investment in these three countries in Southeast Asia is quite 
dominant, which makes various investment regulations (in particular 
regarding the merging of businesses and acquisition of shares) an important 
factor in maintaining a market structure that is efficient and competitive. 
Regionally, statistics have shown that during the past semester in 2010, 
36 merger agreements have occurred in Southeast Asia, with a value of 7.1 
billion USD. It is quite optimistic in comparison to 77 merger agreements with 
a market value of 14.5 billion USD in 2009. Most of the merger activities in 
Southeast Asia have taken place in the sectors of natural resources and energy, 
finance and consumer, and manufacturing. Interestingly, most of the 
investment in Southeast Asia came from China, making up 29% of the total 
merger activities in Southeast Asia. This fantastic figure exceeded the United 
States as the record holder from the previous year. Specifically, most merger 
activities in Southeast Asia were conducted in Singapore, amounting to one-
third of the portion of total transactions in Southeast Asia (with a value of 4.2 
billion over the past year per June), with manufacturing as the sector with the 
greatest frequency of mergers.38 
Regarding the regulations that control business competition and mergers, 
currently, out of the ten member countries of ASEAN, only five of them 
(Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia) possess laws on 
business competition. Malaysia itself had only introduced its business 
competition law in 2010, which became effective in 2012. Five other countries 
still rely on the sector approach and are preparing the aforementioned policy. 
Regulations on business mergers and acquisitions have several differences 
regarding various aspects, specifically regarding coverage, nature, approach, 
financing, and related sanctions. The following is a brief table that summarizes 
the condition of merger regulations in ASEAN: 
Table3: Merger Regulations in ASEAN Member Countries 
No. Country Merger 
Regulatio
ns 







Absent - - - - 
2. Cambodia Absent - - - - 
3. Indonesia Present Consolidati
on, Merger, 
Required Present Absent 
                                                             
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 






4. Laos Present Merger Optional Absent Absent 
5. Malaysia  Absent - - -  
6. Myanmar  Absent - - -  




Required Present Present 







Optional Absent Present 





Required Absent Absent 








Required Present Absent 
Source: Primary Legal Materials, processed 
 
The ten ASEAN member nations, only six countries possess regulations 
on mergers, whether under its competition law or present in sector regulations. 
Five countries (Laos, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) possess 
merger regulations under competition law, while the Philippines still relies on 
sector merger (in the finance sector).39 
Indonesia itself at present has possessed special regulations on business 
mergers and acquisition, which is Government Regulation No. 57/2010 on 
Business Consolidation and Merger and Takeover of Shares that May Cause 
Monopolistic Practices and Unhealthy Business Competition. The regulations, 
which are the execution of Article 28 of Law No. 5/1999 on the Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and Unhealthy Business Composition is the starting 
point for the application of a quite significant merger regime in Indonesia.40 
                                                             
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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This regulation requires that business people who are about to perform a 
merger are to report the plan after the merger is approved by law. The same 
requirement is also adopted by two other countries, Thailand and Vietnam. 
What is interesting is that Singapore instead does not require notifications on 
merger activities carried out in the country. It is a unique fact when 
considering that the most significant market capitalization in Southeast Asia 
occurs in the city-state. In considering coverage, the above table indicates that 
Vietnam has the most complete coverage of mergers, including business 
consolidation, business merging, acquisition, joint venture, as well as other 
forms of integration. This will certainly be to the benefit of the country in 
facing competition in the later era of free trade.41 
Meanwhile, merger regulations in Indonesia are limited to 
consolidation, merger, and share acquisition. Asset acquisition is not included 
in the coverage of Indonesia and supervision is only on the increase in control 
by businesspeople through ownership of shares. To guarantee the creation of 
a competitive market structure, the obligation of notification by 
businesspeople regarding merger efforts is very much necessary. Out of the 
four countries that possess regulations of mergers in their business 
competition regulations, effectively only Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam 
that requires notifications on merger activities. However, Thailand itself in 
one way has not been able to obligate the notification. It is because its business 
competition law does mandate the obligation of notification, but only if it 
fulfils a certain threshold.42 
 
2. Single Market and Free Trade Area in the Scope of ASEAN 
Economic integration among countries in a regional area, which may 
be in the formation of a Single Market, Free Trade Area, or Customs Union, 
is one of the consequences of the liberalization of trade that is unavoidable by 
all countries, as well as an effort to respond to the globalization of the world 
economy. A Free Trade Area (FTA) is a form of a free trade agreement that is 
established among one or more countries to create an area of free trading, 
wherein the trade of goods or services among them may occur past the 
boundaries of the respective countries without being impeded by imposed 
tariffs or non-tariff barriers. Next, a Customs Union is fundamentally an FTA 
that carries external tariff policies that apply to member countries that wish to 
create trade policies with outside parties. As such, in addition to being an 
agreement to remove trade barriers, whether those in tariff or non-tariff forms, 
as well as to eliminate customs duties, a Customs Union creates a single policy 
for external tariffs (tariffs that apply for countries that are not members of the 
FTA). 
                                                             
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 




The formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within 15 years 
had been agreed upon in the fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, and 
the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Agreement, which 
constitutes the primary mechanism of the AFTA, had been signed by the 
Ministers of Economies of ASEAN on January 28, 1992. Even so, the 
economic integration in ASEAN is not the integration that has been realised 
in the area of the European Union in recent times and does not merely copy 
the steps taken by the European Economic Community. At the ASEAN 
Summit in 2003 in Bali, the leaders of ASEAN stressed that the economic 
integration to be achieved would not lead ASEAN into a political unification, 
which means there will be no supranational institutions such as the European 
Commission, and will also not make customs systems to be uniform (a 
customs union). 
In principle, what is contained in the AFTA is the removal of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers among ASEAN member countries in a gradual manner 
through the CEPT Agreement. During the sixth ASEAN Summit in December 
1998, there had been an agreement to accelerate AFTA to be realized in 2002 
(2006 for Vietnam, 2008 for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia) 
with tariffs that range from 0-5%. This acceleration is implemented with 
several “flexibilities”, wherein the condition that the six ASEAN member 
countries are ready to reduce tariffs of several products to 0-5% in 2002, this 
may be performed in 2003.43 In 2003, the products involved in the AFTA must 
have tariffs with a maximum of 5%.44 
In addition, AFTA also contains agreements of tariff harmonization 
among the member countries of ASEAN, but each country is free to determine 
tariffs of trading with non-ASEAN member countries. As such, several things 
need to be performed, in particular in relation to harmonization in the field of 
custom sand removal of other forms of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The 




The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) has enabled businesspeople 
in ASEAN member countries to conduct business transactions in whichever 
country that they prefer. The aim of the AEC is quite good, which is to ease 
businesspeople in running their businesses. However, this aim will become a 
threat if it is not supported by competition laws that can provide clear 
regulations that apply globally to all businesspeople. Without clear 
                                                             
43 Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), November 21, 2019. 
https://www.usasean.org/regions/asean/afta/common-effective-preferential-tariff. 
44 See Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area. 
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regulations, businesspeople may freely engage in cross-border transactions 
that may disrupt the domestic markets of each ASEAN member country. 
The existing differences in regulatory substances and the void in 
competition law regulations in several ASEAN member countries will 
certainly become challenges for the application of competition laws by 
businesspeople in the ASEAN regional market. However, regarding AFTA, 
the primary urgency is instead the realization of imposing tariffs of 0-5%, by 
performing harmonization of regulations in the field of Customs and the 
removal of other forms of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). The removal of 
barriers to trade is one of the things that are also regulated in competition law. 
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